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BEYOND HOFFMAN PLASTIC: REFORMING NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS POLICY TO CONFORM TO THE
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT
SHAHID HAQUE*
INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") purports to grant
equal protection to all workers employed in America. Despite the
fact that most undocumented workers fall under the broad definition
of an employee under the Act,' the application of the law to such
workers often leaves them without any effective means of protection
against employer abuses. When an undocumented worker complains
of wrongful employer conduct, the employee often faces retaliation
such as a demotion, loss of employment, or the initiation of deporta-
tion proceedings. The remedies afforded to undocumented workers
under current law for such wrongful conduct are limited, undermining
incentives for the undocumented worker to expose employer abuses.
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB illustrates the problem.2 Because undocumented work-
ers cannot be lawfully employed in this country under the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), the Court foreclosed
backpay as a remedy available to such workers. 3
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2005;
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration and Sociology, University of Southern Indiana,
2001.
1. The definition of an employee under the NLRA includes all workers except those
employed under certain enumerated conditions. One exception includes "any individual em-
ployed as an agricultural laborer." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). As of 2002, there were 5.3 million
undocumented workers in the urban labor force and 1.2 million undocumented workers in the
agricultural labor force. Rebecca Smith et al., Undocumented Workers: Preserving Rights and
Remedies after Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB at 1-2 (citing B. Lindsey Lowell &
Roberto Suro, How Many Undocumented: The Numbers Behind the U.S.-Mexico Migration
Talks) (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/wlghoffO4O303.pdf. While a
significant number of undocumented workers are therefore excluded from coverage under the
Act, undocumented workers as a whole are not.
2. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
3. Id. at 140.
CHICAGO-KENT LA IV REVIEW
The dilemma underlying the employment of undocumented
workers in the United States is that it always involves bad faith con-
duct on the part of either the employer, the employee, or both.4 While
unscrupulous employers often hire undocumented workers in order
to exploit them for cheap labor, it is also true that many undocu-
mented workers obtain employment by defrauding employers with
the use of false documentation. Congress has determined that the
desire for employment is the "magnet" that draws undocumented
workers into the country.' The IRCA was designed to counteract this
force by eliminating employment opportunities for such workers.' If
the court were to grant undocumented workers access to legal reme-
dies such as backpay, there would be a risk of undermining immigra-
tion policy by rewarding violations of the IRCA, granting quasi-legal
status to illegal workers, and encouraging more undocumented work-
ers to enter the workforce.7
Nevertheless, the lack of protection afforded to undocumented
workers following the Hoffman decision merits attention for many
reasons. By limiting remedies allowed to undocumented workers and
thus limiting the punishment issued for wrongful conduct by an em-
ployer, the law indirectly encourages employer abuses and generates
a greater incentive for employers to hire undocumented workers.8
Not only does this impair the interests of existing undocumented
workers, but it contravenes immigration policy by drawing a larger
number of undocumented workers into the country, taking jobs9 and
depressing wages earned by legal workers. 10
4. Id. at 148 ("Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent identification, which
subverts the cornerstone of the IRCA's enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly
hires the undocumented alien in direct contradiction of its IRCA obligations.").
5. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1 at 46 (1986).
6. Id. at 45-46 ("[This] bill establishes penalties for employers who knowingly hire un-
documented aliens, thereby ending the magnet that lures them to this country.").
7. See Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 149-51.
8. Absent the threat of backpay, it may prove to be in an employer's financial interests to
"look the other way" when reviewing undocumented applicants, because the benefits an em-
ployer can gain from the exploitation of such workers can outweigh the penalties incurred,
especially the penalties incurred for a first time offense. Id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984) (stating that a "primary purpose
in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for American workers").
10. A study conducted by the University of Illinois at Chicago found that the median
hourly wage of an undocumented worker in Chicago is $7.00, while the median hourly wage for
a documented immigrant worker is $9.00. Chirag Mehta et al., Center For Urban Economic
Development, Chicago's Undocumented Immigrants: An Analysis of Wages, Working Condi-
tions. and Economic Contributions 1, 12 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/
uicued/Publications/RECENT/undoc full.pdf. The availability of workers willing to earn only
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The penalties imposed by the IRCA are too miniscule to have
any serious deterring power, especially for first-time violations of the
Act. Coupling these penalties with remedies imposed by the NLRB
for labor violations, however, creates a more effective disincentive to
the hiring of undocumented workers." Unfortunately, following the
Hoffman decision, it is clear that undocumented workers may not
benefit from their violations of federal law through the issuance of
remedies such as backpay and reinstatement. With backpay no longer
available as a remedy to the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board"), employers are not adequately deterred from
the hiring of undocumented workers. In order to effectuate a solution
to this problem, the legislature should impose heightened penalties
upon employers to make it against their financial interests to hire
undocumented workers. This will allow the NLRB to conform to the
mandates of the Hoffman decision without subverting the goals of the
IRCA.
In addition, because the Hoffman decision was a narrow one, it
failed to clarify the proper application of the law under several sce-
narios distinguishable from the one before the Court. In non-
discharge situations, for example, when an undocumented employee
is not fired but merely demoted, the NLRB has been left without any
clear precedent to rely upon. 12 The NLRB has also found the applica-
tion of Hoffman to be uncertain when an employer knowingly hires
an undocumented worker. 3 In order to resolve these situations and
clarify the law as it relates to undocumented workers, the Board
should apply the Hoffman court's reasoning to a broader range of
cases. Additionally, the NLRB has failed to alter its investigatory
process following the Hoffman decision to discover a worker's immi-
gration status prior to seeking a backpay award. 14 In order to comply
with the Hoffinan decision, the NLRB must investigate immigration
status prior to settling claims or seeking remedies foreclosed by the
Court.
With the Hoffman decision functioning as the Court's final word
on immigration policy, this Note explores how to best alter the law to
serve this policy with regard to undocumented workers and their
$7.00 per hour creates an incentive for employers to lower the hourly wages offered to legal
workers.
11. See infra note 168.
12. See infra Part IlI.B.
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part IlI.C.
2004]
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rights against employer misconduct. Part I of this Note briefly ana-
lyzes the history of the IRCA and the NLRA in order to shed light on
the overall purposes and policy considerations of these congressional
enactments. Part II reviews the landmark Hoffman decision and ex-
amines the majority and dissenting viewpoints of the case. The case
law that the Hoffman court relied upon in making its decision is also
examined. Part III looks at how the Hoffman decision affected the
NLRB's internal policy, focusing on areas of the law where the Board
believes Hoffman is not controlling, and seeking to explain why the
Board should limit further remedies to undocumented workers in
order to conform to the Hoffman court's interpretation of the IRCA.
Finally, Part IV proposes amendments to the relevant statutes to
solve the problems identified in the Hoffman dissent and bring the
law in line with the underlying goals of the IRCA.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION
A. Immigration Reform and Control Act
The Immigration Reform and Control Act was enacted in 1986
as an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").1
5
Congress delegated the administration and enforcement of the IRCA
to the Attorney General,1 6 who in turn assigned these responsibilities
to the Immigration and Naturalization Services ("INS"). 7 On March
1, 2003, all of the functions of the INS were transferred to the new
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). 18 The U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services now retain most of the functions of the
former INS. 9 However, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("USICE"), which is the "investigative arm" of the Border and
15. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e) (2000).
17. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9 (2003).
18. Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 10922 (Mar. 6, 2003).
For further information on departmental transfers, see U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices, INS to DHS: Where Is It Now?, http://uscis.gov/graphics/othergov/roadnmp.htm (Mar. 19,
2004).
19. For a background on the goals and responsibilities of the USCIS, see U.S. Citizenship




Transportation Security Directorate, is now primarily responsible for
the enforcement of the IRCA.20
The purpose of the IRCA is to curtail the employment of un-
documented workers by eliminating employment as a factor that
draws these workers into the country.2 Prior to the enactment of the
IRCA, it was against the law for an undocumented worker to enter
the country illegally, but it was not illegal for an employer to hire an
undocumented worker, nor was it a separate crime for an undocu-
mented worker to obtain employment in the United States.22 In re-
sponse to growing concern about the problems created by the
employment of undocumented workers, including the loss of jobs23
and depression of wages earned by legal workers, the IRCA was de-
signed to target employers and prohibit them from knowingly em-
ploying, recruiting, or referring illegal alien workers. 24
The IRCA imposes a mandatory employment verification system
upon employers as a means of ascertaining a worker's legal right to
employment. 25 The Act also made it illegal for an undocumented
worker to undermine this employment verification system through
the use of fraudulent documentation.26 There are three categories of
documents that may be used to prove employment authorization and
identity.27 Any suitable combination of these specified documents
must be accepted as proof of work authorization when a reasonable
20. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE About Organization,
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/about/organization/index.htm (Feb. 25, 2004).
21. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1 at 45-46. The legislature considers employment the primary
factor that draws undocumented workers into the country. Often, however, illegal aliens may
come to the U.S. for other reasons, such as political instability in their home countries, and seek
employment as a secondary goal. See William J. Murphy, Immigration Reform Wwivithout Con-
trol: The Need for an Integrated Immigration-Labor Policy, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
165, 177-78 (1994).
22. Prior to the enactment of the IRCA, the INA did not concern itself to any great extent
with the employment of undocumented workers. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883
892-93 (1984).
23. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. t at 47. The report indicates that in 1986 the unemploy-
ment rate was high, and the country was not in a position to absorb unemployed illegal aliens
into the economy. The legislature believed that allowing undocumented workers to be em-
ployed would take jobs away from legal workers, especially minorities. Id.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(l) (2000).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c.
27. These categories include: (t) documents that provide evidence of both employment
authorization and identity, such as a passport: (2) documents that provide evidence of employ-
ment authorization, such as a social security card; and (3) documents that provide evidence of
identity, such as a driver's license. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(l)(B)-(D).
2(XW1
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examination of the documents reveals them to be authentic. 2 Due to
concerns that the IRCA would cause employers to discriminate
against Hispanic-American citizens 29 and require extra documenta-
tion from such workers, the legislature precluded employers from
requiring workers to produce documentation in excess of that ex-
pressly required under the Act.3" Employers are found to be compli-
ant with the guidelines of the employment verification system when
they act in good faith to comply with these regulations.
3'
In addition to the establishment of the employment verification
system, the IRCA created several forms of sanctions that may be im-
posed upon delinquent employers, including civil fines, cease and
desist orders, and criminal penalties. 32 For an initial offense, the Act
calls for a civil penalty between $250 and $2,000 per undocumented
worker hired.33 After a second violation of the Act, an employer be-
comes subject to fines between $2,000 and $5,000.34 Further violations
incur heightened penalties between $3,000 and $10,000. 35 When an
abusive pattern or practice of employment is discovered, the IRCA
allows a civil action in federal court to be brought to obtain an injunc-
tion against this wrongful activity.3, In this circumstance, the delin-
quent employer also becomes subject to criminal penalties, including
fines up to $3,000 for each undocumented worker and up to six
months imprisonment.
37
These provisions are primarily enforced by USICE. 38 Under the
regulations that the former INS operated under, the USICE has the
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(l)(A)(ii). A document must simply appear to be genuine on its
face in order to fulfill this requirement. Id. Critics of the IRCA claim that this broad language
creates a "loophole" in the Act that allows employers to escape liability for accepting fraudulent
documents. Smith, supra note 1,4.
29. The concern was that employers, facing sanctions for the hiring of undocumented
workers, would be less inclined to hire anyone who could possibly be such a worker. Therefore,
legal Hispanic-American workers might be at risk of discrimination from overly-cautious em-
ployers. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. I at 68.
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)(ii).
3t. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(A).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)-(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(ii).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(iii).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(2).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1).
38. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Investigations-Human Rights
Crimes, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/enforce/invest/invest-hrc.htm (Mar. 17, 2004). However,
the agency's "current enforcement strategy is to focus primarily on worksite enforcement inves-
tigations that involve alien smuggling, human rights abuses and other criminal violations." Id.
Enforcement of the employer sanctions provisions of the IRCA has been steadily decreasing.
[Vol 79:1357
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authority to investigate employers entirely on its own initiative. 39
However, the department must also accept written complaints from
any person with knowledge of a potential violation of immigration
laws.40 If an investigation reveals that the IRCA has been violated, the
USICE issues a notice of intent to fine the employer.', This notice
contains a statement of the charges against an employer, the statutes
that have been violated, and the penalties that will be imposed 2 Em-
ployers have the right to contest the fines issued by the USICE and
request a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.4 3 However, if
this request is not made within thirty days of receipt of the notice of
intent to fine, a final order will be issued by the USICE that cannot
be appealed. 44
Notwithstanding the structural and symbolic changes since the
formation of the Department of Homeland Security, 45 substantive
immigration policy relating to undocumented workers has remained
largely unchanged since the enactment of the IRCA 6.4 The debate
over immigration reform has been reopened, however, with President
George W. Bush's election year proposal to grant undocumented
workers temporary legal work status 7.4 The program, administered by
the Department of Homeland Security, would grant all workers ille-
gally employed in the U.S. the chance to enlist and receive guaran-
teed wage and employment rights.4 Employers who seek to hire
workers from this temporary work program would have the daunting
task of proving that they cannot find U.S. laborers to fill their job
Smith et al., supra note 1, at 5. USICE's administrative focus on more "serious" immigration-
related crimes does nothing to resist this trend.
39. 8. C.F.R. § 274a.9(b) (2003). The Homeland Security Act provides that all references to
the INS will now refer to the appropriate agency within the DHS. Authority of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 10922 (Mar. 6, 2)03).
40. 8. C.F.R. § 274a.9(a).
41. 8. C.F.R. § 274a.9(d).
42. 8. C.F.R. § 274a.9(d)(1).
43. 8. C.F.R. § 274a.9(e).
44. 8. C.F.R. § 274a.9(f).
45. For a critique of the DHS reorganization schemes, see Jeffrey Manns, Reorganization
as a Substitute for Reform: The Abolition of the INS, 112 YALE L.J. 145 (2002).
46. However, a few additional penalties for employer misconduct in document fraud were
created by Congress in 1996, with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 1(4-2)8, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
47. See Ted Barrett & Steve Turnham, Bush Immigration Plan Could Pass Congress, Aides
Predict, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/0l/0 7 /immigration.congress/index.html (Jan.
8, 2004).
48. John King et al., Bush Calls for Changes on Illegal Workers,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/l1/O7/bush.immigration/index.htm (Jan. 7, 2004).
2(X41
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openings.4 9 These workers would receive a temporary three-year work
visa that would be renewable one time, but would then be required to
return to their native countries once these visas expire. 50 The work
visa would not carry with it any guarantee of actual citizenship; work-
ers could apply for permanent U.S. residency, but will receive no
preferential consideration over general applicants? 1 Because the plan
would only apply to workers who are already employed in the United
States, however, it does not address the problems associated with the
steady influx of undocumented workers that arrive in this country
every day. The president's plan has been met with both criticism and
praise, but analysts believe the proposal stands little chance of being
passed by Congress.
52
B. National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA was passed by Congress in 1935 to regulate the la-
bor-management relations of businesses engaged in interstate com-
merce.53 The Act formed the NLRB in order to implement and
enforce the rights guaranteed under the Act.54 The NLRB is made up
of two decision-making bodies: a five-member board responsible for
issuing the agency's final determinations, and the General Counsel
who runs the Board's field offices and is responsible for the initial
investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practices?
5
The NLRA does not specifically exclude undocumented workers
from the protections it grants.56 The Supreme Court has consistently
held that the legislature intended to grant protection to all workers
employed in the country, including undocumented workers. 57 The
49. Id.
50. Id. One of the major flaws in President Bush's plan is its failure to recognize that many
undocumented workers have children who are American citizens. It is unlikely that any of the
workers would want to return to their native countries and either leave their children behind, or
take their children to a country in which the children have never lived.
51. Id.
52. Julia Malone, House Subcommittee Gives Bush Immigration Plan Cold Shoulder, COX
NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 24, 2004.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2(00).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)-(d); see also National Labor Relations Board, About the NLRB,
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/ (Apr. 6, 2004) [hereinafter About the NLRB].
56. See supra note 1.
57. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that the Board's interpretation of
the NLRA was reasonable and supported by the terms of the NLRA). The Supreme Court in
Hoffman affirmed the fact that undocumented workers are covered by the NLRA, but never-
[Vol 79:1357
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purpose of the NLRA is to ensure that employees are given "the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid and protection.... -5" The Act
allows employees to petition for union representation and gives the
NLRB the authority to carry out secret elections to certify the re-
suits. 59 The Act also outlines unfair labor practices60 and gives the
NLRB the authority to sanction violations of these practices through
its arsenal of remedies." The Board may issue remedies such as rein-
statement or backpay to make an employee whole for damages suf-
fered,62 but it is restricted from issuing punitive damages.63
Any allegations of unfair labor practices must be filed with the
NLRB within six months of the occurrence. 64 If enough evidence of
an unfair labor practice is presented to warrant a full investigation,
the Board will assign an agent to interview witnesses and collect evi-
dence related to the case.65 Following this investigation, the Board
will make a decision to either dismiss the charge or seek a settlement
from the employer.66 The Board estimates that ninety percent of all
theless restricted the remedies that they may receive. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140, 144 (2002).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2000i).
60. The NLRA states in relevant part that an employer may not: (1) restrain employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed under 29 U.S.C. § 157; (2) "dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization": (3) condition hiring or continued em-
ployment upon any term of employment meant to discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation; (4) "discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this [Act]"; or (5) "refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). The Board's arsenal of remedies, however, is not limited to rein-
statement and backpay. Congress gave the NLRB broad discretion to formulate remedies that
will effectively enforce the NLRA, and the Board periodically alters its remedial scheme for this
purpose. See Leonard R. Page. NLRB Remedies: Where Are The' Going?, (University of Rich-
mond School of Law, Austin Owen Symposium and Lecture, Apr. 10. 2000), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/r2388.asp.
63. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-13 (1940). The Supreme Court found
that the NLRB's remedies must "relate to the protection of ... employees and the redress of
their grievances, not to the redress of any supposed public injury .... "Id. at 11. Thus, the Board
may not simply issue any penalties or fines that would ultimately serve the goals of the NLRA.
It may only prescribe measures to remedy specific complaints by employees. Id. at 10-13.
64. 29. U.S.C. § 160(b); see also National Labor Relations Board, The NLRB and YOU:
Unfair Labor Practices, http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared-files/brochures/engulp.asp/ (Apr. 8,
2004) [hereinafter NLRB and YOUI.
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 161; see also NLRB and YOU, supra note 64.
66. About the NLRB, supra note 55; NLRB and YOU, supra note 64.
20041
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charges of unfair labor practice are settled at this point.7 If the em-
ployer refuses to settle, however, the Board will file a formal com-
plaint and the case will be brought to an Administrative Law Judge
("AL") for a hearing on the merits.61 At this stage, all the evidence
that the Board collected in the investigatory process will be pre-
sented, and the ALJ will issue a written decision.69 This decision may
be appealed to the NLRB's five-member board to determine the
agency's final stance on the matter.7° The Board's final ruling may be
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals and ultimately to the U.S.
Supreme Court.7"
II. THE HOFFMAN PLASTIC DECISION AND SIGNIFICANT PRIOR
CASE LAW
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, Inc. marked a decisive change in the treatment of remedies
available to undocumented workers in the United States. In May of
1988, Jose Castro, an undocumented worker, used false papers to
satisfy the IRCA's Documentation and Verification procedures and
defrauded Hoffman Plastic into believing he was lawfully entitled to
be employed in this country.72 In December of 1988, Castro became
involved with a unionization campaign and began distributing au-
thorization cards to other employees.73 Shortly thereafter, Castro and
four other employees engaged in union-organizing activities were
fired. 4
The NLRB investigated this case in January of 1992 and deter-
mined that these four employees were unlawfully fired in an attempt
to curtail unionization efforts at the company in clear violation of the
NLRA.1 The NLRB never looked into Castro's legal status as an
employee in the United States because of an internal policy specifi-
67. About the NLRB, supra note 55.
6& About the NLRB, supra note 55; NLRB and YOU, supra note 64.
69. About the NLRB, supra note 55.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Board found that Hoffman Plastics violated Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA,
which prohibits an employer from discouraging membership in a labor union through its hiring
practices. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000).
[Vol 79:1357
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cally excluding such questions from factoring into an investigation.76
As a result, the NLRB ordered that Hoffman immediately stop its
wrongful behavior and take no further action to curtail union organiz-
ing activities. Additionally, Hoffman was ordered to prominently post
a detailed notice to all employees informing them of their wrongdoing
and subsequent conformance.77 Finally, the NLRB ordered Hoffman
to offer reinstatement and backpay to all of the employees wrongfully
discharged. 71 Hoffman agreed to abide by the NLRB's decision and
implement these terms.79
In June of 1993, however, the matter was brought before an ALJ
for a compliance hearing.SO In the course of this hearing, Castro testi-
fied for the first time that he was an undocumented worker who had
never been legally admitted into the United States and was never
granted authorization to work in this country."1 Castro admitted that
he gained employment at Hoffman only after tendering the false birth
certificate of a friend and passing it off as his own. 2 This birth certifi-
cate was also used to fraudulently obtain a Social Security Card and
California driver's license.83
In light of this new information, the AU decided that the
IRCA's prohibition against hiring undocumented workers, and prior
case law, including Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, precluded Castro from
receiving backpay and reinstatement.14 Sure-Tan involved an em-
ployer that violated the NLRA by reporting a number of undocu-
mented employees to the INS in retaliation for union-organizing
activities.85 Several of these workers voluntarily left the country to
avoid being deported.86 The NLRB found that Sure-Tan's actions
76. See Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Office of the General Counsel Memorandum GC 02-06 (July
19, 2002) (writing that "[rlcgions have no obligation to investigate an employees immigration
status unless a respondent affirmatively establishes the existence of a substantial immigration
issue"), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nirb/shared-files/gcmemo/gcmemo/gcO2-O6.asp [herein-
after NLRB Memorandum GC 02-06].s
77. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 140.
78. Id. at 140-41.
79. Id. at 141. A reinstatement offer was sent and should have stopped the tolling of back-
pay at the time of receipt. However, it was determined that the reinstatement offer tendered by
Hoffman Plastics was not detailed enough to be valid. Thus, the backpay period continued to
accrue beyond this point. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1061 (1998).





85. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,887 (1984).
86. Id.
20041
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amounted to a constructive discharge, and ordered the company to
offer the discharged employees reinstatement and backpay despite
their undocumented status." The Court of Appeals in Sure-Tan ruled
that backpay could not accrue during a period of time in which an
employee is not lawfully available for work, and also modified the
Board's order by requiring that the workers be legally present and
able to be employed in the country before being offered reinstate-
ment.8" The Supreme Court upheld these determinations. 9
Several years after the Hoffman compliance hearing was de-
cided, the NLRB reversed the AL's denial of backpay as a result of a
new departmental policy regarding undocumented workers.90 Because
the ALJ reached this decision prior to the NLRB's policy determina-
tions in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.,91 the Board sought to
review the Hoffman decision again. 92 In A.P.R.A. Fuel, after review-
ing the objectives of the IRCA and the NLRA, the Board concluded
that the best way to reconcile the two Acts was to provide undocu-
mented workers with exactly the same protections and remedies
available to citizens legally authorized to work in this country.93 The
Board reasoned that if hiring undocumented workers does not afford
employers any particular exploitative ability, such as the ability to pay
decreased wages or fire an employee at will, the employer will have
no incentive to hire an undocumented worker over a legally author-
ized worker.9 4 Under these conditions, the threat of sanctions and the
inability to take advantage of undocumented workers will leave em-
ployers with only disincentives to hire such workers.95 In light of this
new policy, the NLRB found that Castro was entitled to backpay plus
interest.9 6 The Board calculated the amount of backpay owed by tak-
ing into account the time period between when Hoffman illegally
87. Id. at 888.
88. Id. at 889.
89. Id. at 903. However, the Supreme Court rejected the decision of the Court of Appeals
to grant a minimum six-month backpay award for the employees' lost wages. This award was
deemed to be purely conjectural and exceeded the court's authority. Id. at 901,903-04.
90. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 141.
91. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995).
92. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 141.
93. A.P.R.A. Fuel, 320 N.L.R.B. at 415; see infra notes 133-136 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the A.P.R.A. Fuel case.
94. A.P.R.A. Fuel, 320 N.L.R.B. at 415.
95. See id. This is only the case, however, when an undocumented worker asserts his/her
rights and risks bringing his/her immigration status to light. If an employer does not believe that
such information will be uncovered, an incentive may still exist to hire undocumented workers.
96. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 141-42.
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fired Castro to the time when they first learned Castro was undocu-
mented, because at this point Hoffman would have been legally re-
quired to fire Castro in order to conform to IRCA guidelines.97 Castro
was awarded backpay for a four-and-a-half-year span that added up
to $66,951, plus interest. 91
Hoffman appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals but was
denied review. Hoffman then petitioned for a writ of certiorari that
was granted by the Supreme Court. 9 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals and rescinded the NLRB's
award of backpay.100 In this opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, the
Court expounded the principle that the NLRB's power to grant
remedies for violations of the NLRA is not so broad as to allow it to
contravene another law. 0 The Court found that "the Board has not
been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations
Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally
important congressional objectives."102
The Court determined that when the remedial decisions of the
NLRB run contrary to other federal laws, courts should not defer to
the Board's judgment.103 By awarding backpay in this case, the NLRB
effectively ignored Castro's own wrongful conduct and sought to
"award backpay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed,
for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job ob-
tained in the first instance by criminal fraud."'104 The Court explained
that it is not possible for an undocumented alien to attain employ-
ment in this country without a clear violation of the IRCA on the part
of the employer, the employee, or both parties. 105 In this case, the
wrongful conduct fell squarely upon Castro himself, who defrauded
Hoffman into hiring him through the use of false identification. The
court found that to award backpay despite such a violation of the




100. Id. at 139.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 143 (quoting Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 148-49.
105. Id. at 148.
1(6. Id. at 150.
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The NLRB admitted that an undocumented worker loses the
right to backpay once INS deportation proceedings have been initi-
ated or when the worker has departed the country.1 7 It follows from
this that the only way an undocumented worker can receive backpay
is if he remains in the country illegally.' The Court also noted the
inability of undocumented workers to mitigate damages as a problem
with awarding backpay to undocumented workers.0 9 All employees
seeking backpay as a remedy must attempt to mitigate their damages
by seeking other employment. 10 In the case of the undocumented
worker, however, this is impossible. The undocumented worker can-
not legally work, and thus cannot seek other employment without
violating the IRCA a second time."' For all of these reasons, Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that "allowing the Board to award back-
pay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory pro-
hibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA.
It would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immi-
gration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws,
and encourage future violations.""'
The Court noted that the employer does not escape punishment
simply because backpay is not being paid. Hoffman was still ordered
to cease its wrongful activity and post a prominent notice to employ-
ees explaining their rights and the company's history of curtailing
these rights.1 3 In addition, if it failed to comply with the Board's or-
ders, the company would face contempt proceedings." 4 The Court
expressed its belief that such sanctions are effective to secure national
policy, and noted that even if such remedies are not sufficient, it is the
province of Congress and not the courts to expand the NLRB's power
to create more effective remedies."5
In his dissenting opinion to the Hoffman decision, Justice Breyer
attacked the policy-based arguments advanced by the majority and
argued that the legislature did not intend for the IRCA to remove any
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 150-51.
110. Id. at 150.
111. Id. at 151.
112. Id.





remedial authority from the Board."6 Because the predominant pur-
pose of the IRCA was to diminish the attractive forces that pull un-
documented workers to seek employment in the United States,
Breyer argued that awarding backpay actually supports immigration
policy." 7 Justice Breyer did not believe that awarding backpay would
play a large role in pulling undocumented workers into the United
States, because at the time such workers illegally find their way into
the country, they could not realistically be considering the possibility
of future employer abuses and the legal remedies available to them.'
Withholding backpay, on the other hand, would increase the strength
of the forces that draw undocumented workers into the country be-
cause it makes it more profitable for employers to hire and exploit
these workers in ways not possible with legal employees." 9 After the
removal of backpay as a remedial tool available to the NLRB, the
remaining remedies only impose future obligations upon employers
and do not cover past conduct. Justice Breyer argued that these re-
maining remedies are insufficient to truly deter wrongful conduct by
employers. 120 By only imposing future restrictions on employers and
not requiring payment of backpay, an employer is able to retain sub-
stantial profits from their wrongful conduct. 2' Under these condi-
tions, Breyer noted that employers may be willing to take a chance on
an unfair labor practice, secure in the knowledge that the worst thing
that could happen for the initial offense is being required to cease and
desist the activity. 122
III. ALTERING NLRB POLICIES IN ORDER TO CONFORM TO POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS ADVANCED BY THE HOFFMAN COURT
The Hoffman decision dramatically changed the ways in which
the NLRB may handle undocumented worker cases. The Hoffman
116. Id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1 at 58 (stating that it
is "not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions of the bill be used
to undermine in any way labor protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or
state labor relations boards... to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented
workers for exercising their rights.. protected by existing law")). The majority criticized
Breyer's use of "a single Committee Report from one House of a politically divided Congress."
Id. at 150 n.4.
117. Id. at 153.
118. Id. at 155.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 154.
121. Id. at 155-56.
122. Id. at 155-56.
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decision was a narrow ruling, but the broad policy based arguments
that the Court used in making its decision have created a number of
questions that need to be clarified by the Board. This confusion ex-
tends farther than the NLRB, as both state and federal courts have
been forced to contend with the issue of undocumented workers
rights in areas completely unrelated to the labor violations in Hoff-
man, such as the rights of undocumented workers to collect damages
in personal injury cases. 123 The NLRB has undertaken to construe the
Hoffman decision as narrowly as possible and has generally not ap-
plied the reasoning of the Court to situations the Court did not have
specific opportunity to review. Situations that the NLRB finds distin-
guishable from Hoffman include reinstatement when an employer
knowingly hires an undocumented worker and backpay in non-
discharge situations.1 24 In addition, the Board sees their role as pro-
tecting all workers, whether documented or undocumented, and even
after the Hoffman decision has refused to look into the immigration
status of employees that file complaints with the Board.
25
A. Backpay and Reinstatement Where an Employer Knowingly Hires
an Undocumented Worker
The Hoffman court was quite clear in its ruling that backpay is an
impermissible remedy for undocumented workers when it is the em-
ployee's own wrongful violation of the IRCA that provides the occa-
sion for employment. 126 The Board has also advised that backpay
should not be sought when an employer knowingly hires an undocu-
mented worker, despite the fact that Hoffman is "arguably" not con-
trolling. 127 The General Counsel of the NLRB has stated that "the
clear thrust of the majority opinion [in Hoffman] precludes backpay
for all unlawfully discharged undocumented workers regardless of the
circumstance of their hire.
'128
123. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tex. App. 2003) (finding that
Hoffman does not preclude an undocumented worker from receiving compensation for lost
earning capacity because Hoffman only applies to NLRA actions, and because Texas law does
not require immigration to factor into such matters); Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, 2003 WL
22519678 at *5-6 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003) (finding that Hoffman does not allow an undocu-
mented worker to recover lost income based on projected future earnings).
124. NLRB Memorandum GC 02-06, supra note 76.
125. Id.
126. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 151.




When an employer establishes that it did not know of an em-
ployee's undocumented status, the General Counsel has taken the
Hoffman decision to preclude reinstatement as well. 29 Because the
Hoffman court did not directly rule on the issue of reinstatement,
however, the Board has not extended the Court's reasoning to pro-
hibit reinstatement when an employer knowingly hires an undocu-
mented worker. 130 The Board argues that in such circumstances
reinstatement is conditioned upon satisfaction of the IRCA guide-
lines, and is thus exempt from the Hoffman Court's concerns about
conflicting with the Act. 3 ' In such circumstances, the Board falls back
on case law decided before Hoffman, such as A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buy-
ers Group.'32
In A.P.R.A. Fuel, an employer knowingly hired several undocu-
mented workers but later fired them for union activities. 3  The Board
ordered that these workers be offered reinstatement and backpay.134
Because undocumented workers cannot be employed in the country
without violating the IRCA, this reinstatement was conditioned upon
satisfaction of the IRCA document and verification procedure within
a reasonable period of time. 131 The Board ordered backpay to be
awarded until the point of reinstatement or until a reasonable period
of time had passed without the employees satisfying the IRCA docu-
ment requirements for employment.36
The NLRB's reliance upon A.P.R.A. Fuel is faulty, however, be-
cause the policy considerations advanced by the Hoffinan decision
make it unlikely that A.P.R.A. Fuel would be upheld today. One of
the effects of the Hoffman decision was the expansion of focus to
examine wrongdoing on the part of the undocumented employee as
well as the employer.'37 The Hoffman decision made it clear that vio-
lations of the IRCA on the part of an employee were not to be re-
129. "IW]here a respondent, as in Hoffman. establishes that it would not have hired or
retained the discriminatee had it known of his or her undocumented status during the period of
employment, Regions should refrain from seeking a reinstatement remedy." NLRB Memoran-








137. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 143. 148-09 (2002).
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warded. 38 Because the Hoffman decision underscored the idea that
two wrongs do not make a right, the NLRB is incorrect to focus on an
employer's misconduct and use this as a reason to reward the em-
ployee.
Awarding reinstatement, even when an employer knowingly
hires an undocumented worker, ignores the Supreme Court's concern
about rewarding employment "obtained in the first instance by crimi-
nal fraud."1 39 By offering reinstatement, even conditional
reinstatement contingent upon becoming lawfully entitled to em-
ployment, the Board would be rewarding an employee's initial viola-
tion of the IRCA and granting legitimacy to employment gained
through unlawful means. Intentional employer misconduct is more
culpable than unintentionally hiring an undocumented worker and,
perhaps, should warrant more serious sanctions. However, in light of
the policy considerations advanced by the Hoffman court, the circum-
stances of an employee's hire should have no effect on the remedies
that an employee receives as compensation for an employer's wrong-
doing. Thus, the Board should prohibit conditional reinstatement as a
remedy available to undocumented workers under the NLRA.
B. Backpay in Non-Discharge Situations
The NLRB has found that the Hoffman decision does not pre-
clude the availability of backpay in non-discharge situations.1 40 A non-
discharge situation arises when an undocumented worker has not
been fired but remains employed subject to unlawful working condi-
tions.141 Common examples of this include being unlawfully paid a
lower wage than what is owed or being discriminatorily demoted to a
lower paying position for engaging in union activities.1 42 The Hoffman
decision restricts remedies available to undocumented workers for
work not actually performed, 43 but the Board argues that backpay is
proper in non-discharge situations where the employee is receiving
payment for work that was performed but was simply not compen-
sated properly.'" Another problem the Hoffman court identified with
138. Id.
139. Id. at 149.
140. NLRB Memorandum GC 02-06, supra note 76.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 149.
144. NLRB Memorandum GC 02-06, supra note 76.
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the awarding of backpay was the inability of an employee to mitigate
damages without again violating the IRCA. 145 By contrast, in a non-
discharge situation the employee has no requirement to mitigate
damages because the job was never actually lost. 146 Federal case law
supports the Board's interpretation of Hoffman as allowing compen-
sation for work actually performed.14
Nevertheless, the Board is barred from granting backpay in such
circumstances because such an award would be punitive and not re-
medial. 148 The court in Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB found that
[a]n alien who had no right to be present in this country at all, and
consequently had no right to employment, has not been harmed in
a legal sense by the deprivation of employment to which he had no
entitlement.... [Tihe award provisions of the NLRA are remedial,
not punitive, in nature, and thus should be awarded only to those
individuals who have suffered harm.149
Because it foreclosed backpay based on policy considerations raised
by the IRCA, the Supreme Court in Hoffman declined to address the
issue of whether backpay in such circumstances amounts to a punitive
damage award. 150 Until this issue is resolved, the Board should not
seek backpay for work performed, because this would overstep its
remedial powers.
When the employee has been demoted into a lower paying posi-
tion, the question exists as to whether backpay would qualify as work
performed, and thus be distinguishable from the policy considerations
in Hoffman. The NLRB has issued a general memorandum requiring
such cases to be submitted to the Board's Department of Advice.l 5 1
The problem here lies in the fact that the worker is being paid the
proper wage for the position he or she actually held, and awarding
backpay for a higher paying position that the worker did not actually
hold is similar to awarding backpay in a discharge situation.152 In both
145. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 150-01.
146. NLRB Memorandum GC 02-06, supra note 76.
147. See Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., 2002 WL 1163623 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002) (finding
that Hoffman does not apply to claims for unpaid wages for work actually performed); Singh v.
Jutla & C.D. & R.'s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (2002) (finding that Hoffman's restric-
tion on backpay was a specific exclusion and did not extend to the collection of unpaid wages
for work performed)
148. See Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1119 (7th Cir. 1992); see supra
note 63 for an explanation of why the NLRB is restricted from issuing punitive remedies.
149. Del Rey Tortilleria, 976 F.2d at 1119 (quoting Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers'
Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986) (Beezer, J., dissenting in part)).
150. See Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 152 n.6.
151. NLRB Memorandum GC02-06,supra note 76.
152. Id.
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cases, the worker would be receiving compensation for work that was
never actually performed.
In Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, the District Court for the
District of Kansas disallowed projected future earnings to an un-
documented worker because it invoked the Hoffinan Court's concern
about rewarding work not performed. 153 This case involved an illegal
immigrant who was involved in a car crash and suffered critical inju-
ries. 1 54 The undocumented worker brought suit to recover for lost
income based on anticipated future earnings in the United States.155
The court found that while the Hoffman decision does not preclude
recovery for work performed, it does bar recovery for projected earn-
ings by an illegal immigrant. 156
Hernandez-Cortez is distinguishable from the type of situation
the NLRB is likely to encounter, because the damages an employee
seeks through the NLRB for a wrongful demotion are for past work,
rather than a projection of future earnings contingent upon remaining
in the country illegally. Also, the ability to perform the labor for
which the employee seeks compensation is unilaterally taken away by
the employer. The fact remains, however, that the employee has not
actually performed the work for the higher paying position. Because
actual performance of the labor seems to be the defining criteria by
which undocumented workers can collect damages, the Board should
preclude the awarding of backpay for non-discharge situations that
involve speculative damages. Of course, the decision in Del Rey Tor-
tilleria may also serve as a bar to awarding backpay for work not per-
formed.
157
C. The NLRB's Duty to Investigate Immigration Issues
The NLRB has determined that the Hoffman decision does not
shift to them the burden of conducting immigration investigations to
determine a worker's legal right to be employed in the country."8
Under current policy, all employees are presumed to be lawfully enti-
tled to work, and even the direct allegation of undocumented status is
not enough to warrant a sua sponte investigation on the part of the
153. Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, 2003 WL 22519678 at *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003).
154. Id. at *3-4.
155. Id. at *5.
156. Id. at *7.
157. See Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1119 (7th Cir. 1992).
158. NLRB Memorandum GC 02-06. supra note 76.
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NLRB. 159 Rather, until the party making the allegation presents evi-
dence establishing a "substantial immigration issue," the Board will
not investigate any allegations made against a claimant.160 The current
NLRB policy is akin to a "don't ask, don't tell" type of situation and
appears to be designed with the protection of undocumented workers
in mind. The NLRB espouses the IRCA's protection against em-
ployer harassment as justification for their position.161
Because the NLRB is presumably investigating the claim as a
whole, however, it is in the best position to discover questions of im-
migration status. By refusing to inquire into the status of undocu-
mented workers and leaving such a determination to be discovered at
the compliance stage of a case, the Board has created several prob-
lems. One such problem stems from the capacity of the NLRB to peti-
tion an employer as an advocate of the employee and seek a
settlement award."2 Over ninety percent of NLRB cases are settled
rather than brought before an ALJ.163 It is only when a case is brought
before an AU that questions of immigration status come into play.
By settling a case involving an undocumented worker, the Board is in
effect subverting the decision of the Supreme Court in Hoffman and
rewarding undocumented employees for violations of the IRCA.
If the Hoffman decision is to be taken as representative of the
policy required by the IRCA, then the Board should not be permitted
to reward an undocumented worker through settlement anything that
the worker would not be entitled to receive through actual litigation.
Allowing the Board to settle undocumented workers' claims before
the workers' immigration status comes to light is in direct conflict
with the Hoffman decision and its interpretation of the IRCA.
In addition to these concerns, the Board creates inefficiencies in
the legal process and over-burdens an already overloaded system by
failing to discover an employee's immigration status in a timely fash-
ion to help filter out cases that it cannot remedy. The Board could use
the investigatory powers that the legislature granted the agency' 64 and
identify immigration problems as early as possible to streamline the
159. Id.
160. Id. Exactly what constitutes a "substantial immigration issue" is not clear. However, an
employer must establish "that it knows or has reason to know that a discriminatee is undocu-
mented." An employer's allegation alone is not sufficient. Id.
161. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying note 66.
163. See supra text accompanying note 67.
164. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).
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process and rule out remedies forbidden by the IRCA. Nevertheless,
the NLRB fails to discover this immigration information until an em-
ployer refuses to comply with its order and the case is brought to an
AU. Time and effort is wasted pursuing remedies that will be entirely
unavailable because they have been barred by the Supreme Court.
Concerns may arise that charging the NLRB with the responsi-
bility of determining immigration status is too much of a burden to
place on the agency, and that such immigration investigations go
beyond the agency's purpose as defined by the NLRA. There is a
difference, however, between actively investigating an employee's
immigration status and simply including immigration related ques-
tions among the many details that are asked of a claimant during the
course of an investigation. The NLRB should not be charged by the
legislature to actively investigate the immigration status of claimants,
but it should be required to employ good faith to uncover such infor-
mation where it may be reasonably brought forward in the course of
conduct. This means that the NLRB should question employees on
their immigration status and collect information such as alien registra-
tion and social security numbers. When possible, this information
should be cross-referenced with the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity. In some cases, cross referencing such information will prove un-
necessary as the question itself will induce an admission of illegal
status.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO RECTIFY PROBLEMS
CREATED BY THE HOFFMAN DECISION
As the Supreme Court stated in the Hoffinan decision, it is up to
the legislature to amend current statutes to solve any remedial prob-
lems created by the Court's decision. 16 5 The principal problem created
by the Hoffman court's decision is the lack of a strong deterrent
against wrongful employer conduct.166 As Justice Breyer argued in his
dissent to the Hoffman decision, employers would be more likely to
risk violations of the NLRA and IRCA knowing that their only sanc-
tions will come in the form of a cease and desist order and a require-
ment to post notice of their infraction to all new employees.167 While
the IRCA does impose criminal penalties upon employers for re-
165. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002).




peated violations, the civil penalties imposed by the Act are too insig-
nificant to serve as an effective deterrent.16 Despite such penalties,
employers can still profit from egregious violations of labor laws.
It is clear that to counteract the benefits that employers receive
from hiring undocumented workers, there must be a closely
corresponding detriment imposed upon them. Although the NLRB
may be in the best position to discover employer abuses and issue
penalties, the NLRB is restricted from imposing punitive remedies."9
Thus, the remedial power of the NLRB should be delegated in such
situations to the USICE. While the penalties imposed by the NLRA
are geared towards making the undocumented employee whole for
the damages suffered through unfair labor practices, the penalties
imposed by the USICE may be punitive in nature and may be di-
rected at penalizing employers to ensure industry compliance with the
IRCA. This will address the concerns raised by the dissent in Hoff-
man and allow the NLRB to withhold remedies to undocumented
workers without tipping the scales of the IRCA and encouraging em-
ployer abuses.
The most direct way to counteract the profits an employer gains
from the illegal employment of undocumented workers is to impose
strong financial penalties for this wrongful conduct. For legal employ-
ees, such financial penalties are imposed when an employer is re-
quired to pay remedies such as backpay. Because traditional remedies
are barred for undocumented workers, however, the USICE should
fine the employer in the same amount as the remedies that would be
owed to the employee. In the Hoffnan case, for example, the em-
ployer would be fined in the amount of $66,951, plus interest; the
same amount as the backpay Castro was owed for his wrongful dis-
charge.110
While this form of sanction creates the same deterrent power as
actually awarding backpay to an undocumented worker, it still allows
an employer to profit from the employment of undocumented work-
ers in certain circumstances. A better solution is to fine the employer
an amount equal to the benefit it received from the illegal employ-
168. See Id. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that without the threat of being forced to
issue backpay to an employee, employers may be prone to violate the IRCA). In addition to the
low penalty fees, lack of enforcement and loopholes in the wording of the Act are factors that
make the IRCA alone insufficient to prohibit the exploitation of undocumented workers. Smith
et al., supra note 1, at 4-5.
169. See supra note 63.
170. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 142.
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ment of the undocumented worker. This differs from the previous
approach, which simply mirrored the award an undocumented em-
ployee would have gotten before the Hoffman decision, because the
remedies issued to the employee are meant to make the employee
whole. It is possible, however, for an employer to benefit from an
undocumented worker's labor in ways that do not entitle the em-
ployee to recover damages. For instance, if an employer deprives un-
documented workers of safety training that it would have given to
legal employees, it saves money through its wrongful conduct. If no
undocumented worker is actually harmed as a result of this, an em-
ployee might be entitled to an injunction against this practice, but
could not recover damages directly proportional to the employer's
benefit. In order to ensure that the employer is not left with any re-
sidual profit from its illegal activity, it should be fined in an amount
equal to any and all benefits incurred through this illegal activity.
An even better sanction would focus not on the employee's det-
riment or the employer's benefit, but on making the economy whole
for the damage caused to it by the employer's wrongdoing. Often-
times, industry-wide wages are depressed by the hiring of undocu-
mented workers who are paid lower wages than legal employees.
17'
Ensuring that this does not take place is one of the principal purposes
of the IRCA. 17 2 To determine the amount of the damage an employer
causes to industry through its violation of the IRCA, the USICE
would need to look into the employer's illegal activity and determine
how this affected other employees in the company as well as other
companies in the industry. Fining an employer for the harm it caused
the industry is a comprehensive sanction that takes into consideration
the totality of the employer's wrongdoing. This solution would serve
as a strongest financial deterrent to the hiring of undocumented
workers.
Public interest would be served by allowing the USICE to retain
the income generated by these financial penalties and budget it to-
wards programs designed to ensure future compliance with the
IRCA. This income could also be spent rather fittingly on monitoring
the employer and ensuring compliance with the Board's injunction
against future unfair labor practices, as well as launching intensive
investigations of delinquent employers to uncover additional viola-
tions of the law.
171. See supra note 10.




If the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman is to be representa-
tive of the nation's immigration goals, the NLRB must apply the
Court's reasoning to a number of scenarios that were not directly
ruled upon by the Court. Specific instances where the NLRB must
change its policy are in the issuance of reinstatement where an em-
ployer knowingly hires an undocumented worker and backpay in
non-discharge situations. In addition, the Board must alter its policy
of refusing to investigate the immigration status of employees who
file claims with the Board. This procedure leads to settlements that
run contrary to immigration policy and creates inefficiencies in the
legal system. Finally, it is clear that as a result of the Hoffman deci-
sion, employers will have a greater incentive to hire undocumented
workers. To counteract this, the legislature must penalize employers
in new ways designed to counteract the NLRB's inability to sanction
employers through corrective remedies such as backpay. The legisla-
ture should grant the USICE the ability to sanction employers in
amounts equal or greater than the backpay the employer would have
been required to pay prior to the Hoffman decision.
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